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Case Comments
Antitrust: The Supreme Court Recognizes
"Economic Realities" in the Banking Industry
National Bank of Commerce (NBC), a large Seattle-based
bank,' sought to expand its operations into Spokane. Because
of Washington's strict statutory restraints on the geographic ex-
pansion of banks,2 NBC determined that the only manner in
which it could enter the Spokane-area market would be through
merger with an existing Spokane bank. Thus, an agreement was
reached with a medium-sized, state-chartered Spokane bank3 to
merge that bank into NBC. Pursuant to the Bank Merger Act
of 1966, application was made to the Comptroller of the Currency
for approval of the merger.4 As required by that Act,5 the
1. NBC is a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank holding company,
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., and in terms of assets, deposits, and loans
is the second largest banking organization with headquarters in the state
of Washington. At the end of 1971, NBC had assets of $1.8 billion, de-
posits of $1.6 billion, and loans of $881.3 million. It operated 107 branch
banking offices throughout the state, including 59 in the Seattle metro-
politan area and 31 in less developed sections of eastern Washington.
2. There are basically three Washington statutes which restrict
geographic expansion by banks. WAsH. REV. CODE § 30.40.020 (1950) pro-
hibits a state-chartered bank from establishing or operating a branch
in any city or town, outside of its 'home office" community, in which
another bank is regularly transacting business. Moreover, should an ex-
isting bank be acquired, the acquiring bank is not allowed to branch from
the acquired bank. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.08.020(7) (1950) requires that
banks incorporating in Washington include in their articles of incorpora-
tion a clause forbidding for at least 10 years a merger with or the ac-
quisition of their assets by another bank without the consent of the state
supervisor of banking. WASH. Rnv. CODE § 30.04230 (1950) prohibits the
formation of multibank holding companies.
The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) (1970), subjects nationally
chartered banks to the branching limitations imposed on their state coun-
terparts. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); First
Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
3. At the time of the proposed merger, the acquired firm, Washing-
ton Trust Bank, was the eighth largest banking organization with head-
quarters in Washington. At the end of 1971, it had assets of $112 mil-
lion, deposits of $95.6 million, and loans of $57.6 million. It operated
seven branch offices, six in the city of Spokane and one in a Spokane
suburb, thus controlling 17.4 percent of the 46 commercial banking offices
in the Spokane metropolitan area. It was one of 12 medium-sized banks
(banks with assets from $30 million to $250 million) in Washington.
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2) (A) (1970).
5. Id.
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Comptroller requested the Attorney General, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board to evalu-
ate the competitive factors involved in the proposed merger. The
unanimous response was that the proposed merger would have
an anticompetitive effect on banking in the Spokane-area market.
Nevertheless, the Comptroller approved the merger on the basis
of his conclusion that the merger would contribute to the "con-
venience and needs" of the Spokane-area customers by providing
them with services not then available from the Spokane bank.6
Subsequently, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment challenged the legality of the merger under section 7 of
the Clayton Act,7 basing its case entirely on the doctrine of po-
6. The [Comptroller of the Currency] shall not approve-
any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in
any section of the country may be to substantially lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other
manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served.
Id. § 1828 (c) (5).
7. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), provides
in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Prior to the decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963), bank mergers had been considered to be largely out
of the reach of the antitrust laws. It was thought that because authority
had been granted to the Federal Reserve Board by section 11 of the Clay-
ton Act to enforce compliance with those sections of the Act which were
"applicable to banks, banking associations, and trust companies," 15
U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970), banks were therefore exempt from Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) jurisdiction. In Philadelphia Bank, however, the
Court found in the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton Act
a congressional desire to include bank mergers within the purview of
the section even though the exemption of banks from FTC jurisdiction
and the apparent limitation of the section to "stock acquisitions" had
been regarded as preventing its application to the typical bank merger.
The Court also ruled that the Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-
463, 74 Stat. 129, did not preclude application of the antitrust laws.
In reaction to this decision, Congress enacted the Bank Merger Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 1, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c)
(1970)), which was designed to re-establish the primary authority of the
bank regulatory agencies and to limit significantly that of the Justice
Department. The Supreme Court made it very clear in subsequent cases,
however, that the primary standard to be applied in judging the legality
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tential competition.8 The district court dismissed the Govern-
ment's complaint because it found that the merger would have
"no inherent anticompetitive effect" and that it would, in fact,
"substantially" increase competition among commercial banks in
the Spokane metropolitan area.9 On direct appeal, 0 the Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that in the absence of extraordin-
ary circumstances" the potential competition doctrine will not
bar geographic extension mergers by banks in states with strict
statutory restraints on de novo entry and on expansion following
entry into a new geographic market. United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974).12
It is well established that a "necessary predicate" to deciding
whether a merger contravenes section 7 of the Clayton Act is
the determination of the relevant product and geographic mar-
kets.' 3 In Marine Bancorporation, there was no disagreement
that the relevant product market "within which the competitive
effect of the merger [was] to be judged" was the "business of
commercial banking (and the cluster of products and services
of a bank merger was still that found in section 7. United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank,
386 U.S. 361 (1967). See Klebaner, Bank Merger Policy and the Third
National Bank Decision, 22 VAND. L. Rnv. 531 (1969).
8. For a discussion of the potential competition doctrine, see notes
29-46 infra and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973 Trade Cas.
74,496, at 94,244 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
11. See Justice Department Merger Guidelines 20, 1 TRADE REG.
REP. 1 4510, at 6888-89 (1968):
The Department will ordinarily investigate the possibility of
anticompetitive consequences and may in particular circum-
stances bring suit, where an acquisition of a leading firm in a
relatively concentrated or rapidly concentrating market may
serve to entrench or increase the market power of that firm or
raise barriers to entry in that market.
12. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices White,
Brennan, and Marshall dissented, and Justice Douglas did not participate.
13. The statutory phrase "in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country" refers to a relevant market which has both
-product and geographic boundaries. Determination of this mar-
ket is the threshold issue and a "necessary predicate" to a find-
ing of a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
o f . The relevant market generally is defined as the "area
of effective competition" within which one or both of the par-
ticipating firms conduct their business. The "area of effective
competition" is determined by reference to both a product mar-
ket-the "line of commerce"-and a geographic market-the
"section of the country."
3 J. vON KAIJNowSKI, ANTI-TRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 18.01
(1971) (footnotes omitted). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593
(1957).
19751
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denoted thereby) .... ,"14 At issue in the case was the relevant
geographic market.
Prior to Marine Bancorporation, the Court had consistently
held that the "relevant geographic market" to be considered in
evaluating the legality of bank mergers was the "local" banking
market.15 It adhered to this position in Marine Bancorporation
by rejecting the Government's argument that the increasingly
anticompetitive structure of the banking industry commanded a
broader reading of the statutory phrase "section of the country"
in order to effectuate the underlying purposes of section 7.16
While the Government agreed that the Spokane metropolitan
area was "a relevant geographic market,' 7 it argued that a
broader reading of "section of the country" was necessary be-
cause the statewide banking market was becoming "dominated
by only a handful of banks or bank holding companies .... ", 8
Asserting that "state boundaries delineate a distinct area within
which banks are legally insulated from competition by foreign
banking institutions,"' 9 the Government maintained that banks
14. 94 S. Ct. at 2868. The authority of this proposition was under-
scored in United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 94 S. Ct. 2788 (1974),
decided on the same day as Marine Bancorporation. In that case the
Court rejected the district court's finding that there was sufficient com-
petitive overlap between savings banks and commercial banks to include
them in the same product market. While recognizing the increasing de-
gree of direct competition between the two types of institutions, the
Court adhered to its position that the "unique cluster of services provided
by commercial banks" sets them apart for purposes of section 7. Id. at
2794. See United States v. Phillipsburgh Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 359-
62 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 182 n.5 (1968);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 275
n.3 (1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665, 667 (1964).
15. E.g., United States v. Phillipsburgh Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350,
362-65 (1970) (the area in which banks offer the major part of their serv-
ices and to which local customers can practicably turn for alternatives).
Similarly, the market has been defined as the area where "the effect of
the merger on competition will be direct and immediate." United States
v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
The Court's commitment to the concept of localized banking markets
was also underscored in Connecticut Natl Bank:
As indicated by our opinion today in Marine Bancorporation, the
relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is the localized
area in which that bank is in significant, direct competition with
other banks, albeit not the acquiring bank This area must be
defined in accordance with this Court's precedents in prior bank
merger cases.
94 S. Ct. at 2795.
16. Brief for Appellant at 33.
17. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). See id. at 54-65.
18. Id. at 32-33.
19. Id. at 33-34.
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operating within a particular state are consequently required to
confine their geographic expansion within the state boundaries,
resulting in a "statewide network of linked oligopolies" and the
concentration of control of the banking industry in a limited
number of financially powerful banks and bank holding com-
panies.20 Thus, it was argued that where such statewide domina-
tion of local markets develops, the preservation of strong, inde-
pendent banks in local markets, especially in the medium-sized
range, would serve to mitigate the adverse effects of the oligopo-
listic behavior among the state's leading banks and might very
well be the only means of achieving such a result.21
As support for its "statewide" approach to "section of the
country," the Government relied primarily on United States v.
20. Id. at 33-35. The basic premise of the theory is that through
mergers and acquisitions the same few large institutions will face each
other in most of the major local banking markets and that as a result
competition may be substantially lessened within the state as a whole-
a "section of the country" larger than the narrowly drawn local banking
markets which have consistently been held to satisfy that statutory re-
quirement. The Government is particularly concerned with the prospect
of major statewide banks acquiring those local banks with sufficient fi-
nancial capability to challenge the large banks either on their "home
ground" or by expanding their operations into other communities. Very
simply, the Government envisions a continuing trend of oligopolistic be-
havior in local banking markets unrestrained by the threat of de novo
entry or "toehold" acquisition by those financially strong, smaller banks.
Moreover, it contends that once the same few banking institutions have
purchased large market shares in most of the local banking markets in
the state, the resulting local oligopolie. could become "linked." In that
event, the statewide institutions would engage in more standardized, less
competitive business behavior throughout the state; if one major bank
were to attempt to improve its position in a particular local market at
the expense of the other major banks, the retaliatory actions of the others
in the remaining local markets would harm the economic interests of
the entire group. Id. See Baker, Potential Competition in Banking:
After Greeley, What?, 90 BA UNG L.J. 362 (1973); Solomon, Bank
Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 BANK-
ING L.J. 116 (1972).
The Government has been notably unsuccessful in urging this
theory on the district courts. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S.
Ct. 2788 (1974): United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973 Trade
Cas. 1 74,496 (W.D. Wash. 1973), affd, 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974); United
States v. Trans Texas Bancorporation, 1972 Trade Cas. g 74,257 (W.D.
Tex. 1972), affd mem., 412 U.S. 946 (1973); United States v. First Nat'l
Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), affd by equally div-
ided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973); United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,
315 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1970); United States v. First Nat'1 Bank, 310
F. Supp. 157 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F.
Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank,
277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
21, Brief for Appellant at 35.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Pabst Brewing Co.,22 a 1966 case in which the Court had held
section 7 to be violated by a merger which substantially reduced
competition in a single state, in a three-state area, and in the
nation as a whole. The Court, however, rejected23 the Govern-
ment's argument that Pabst required only the identification of
an "economically differentiated" region of the country within
which a merger may "substantially lessen competition,"2 4 holding
that to so broaden the meaning of "section of the country" would
be a total departure from its established connotation as the "area
in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct competitor."25 In
addition, the Government simply failed to satisfy the Court that
the "linked oligopoly" theory supported the conclusion that the
resulting market structure was less than competitive.26 Citing
the observation in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States27 that sec-
tion 7 deals in "probabilities" and not "ephemeral possibilities,"
the Court commented that
[t]he Government's underlying concern for a linkage or net-
work of statewide oligopolistic banking markets is, on [the
record presented] at least, considerably closer to "ephemeral
possibilities" than to "probabilities." To assume, on the basis
of essentially no evidence, that the challenged merger will tend
to produce a statewide linkage of oligopolies is to espouse a per
se rule against geographic market extension mergers .... 28
Because of the Government's primary reliance on the poten-
tial competition argument, the Court's ruling on this point was
fatal to the Government's case. With the "linked oligopoly"
theory unavailable, the case was left to turn entirely on the al-
leged anticompetitive effects of the merger in the narrowly
22. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
23. Some of the Court's language in Pabst suggests that the
Government may challenge a merger under § 7 without estab-
lishing any relevant geographic market .... But Pabst in re-
ality held that the Government had established three relevant
markets in which the acquired firm actually marketed its prod-
ucts-a single State, a multi-state area, and the Nation as a
whole... And in that case the acquiring firm was an actual
competitor of the acquired firm in all three relevant geographic
markets.... Thus while Pabst stands for the proposition that
there may be more than one relevant geographic market it did
not abandon the traditional view that for purposes of § 7 "sec-
tion of the country" means "relevant geographic market" and
the latter concept means the area in which the relevant product
is in fact marketed by the acquired firm.
94 S. Ct. at 2869-70 n.20 (emphasis added). See United States v. Con-
necticut Nat'l Bank, 94 S. Ct. 2788, 2796 (1974).
24. Brief for Appellant at 33.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 2870.
26. Id.
27. 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 2870.
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drawn local banking market. Under these circumstances, it
proved impossible to convince the Court that the potential com-
petition doctrine was applicable within the context of the strin-
gent governmental regulation of the banking industry in the
state.
Notwithstanding the result in Marine Bancorporation, the
potential competition doctrine has become an effective weapon
in the Government's assault on .the anticompetitive effects of
both product and geographic extension mergers.29 Its theoretical
underpinnings are found in Brown Shoe, wherein the Supreme
Court recognized that the antitrust laws could be used to chal-
lenge the anticompetitive effects of oligopoly.80 The basic eco-
nomic defect of an oligopolistic market is considered to be the
tendency of the limited number of firms in such a market to
agree, tacitly or explicitly, on prices for their goods or services
that maximize the long-run profits of all;31 the greater the num-
ber of competitors in a given market the less likely it is that
they will act in concert.32 Aggressive enforcement of section 7
was expected both to encourage additional competitors to enter
a given market, either by de novo expansion or by a "toehold"
acquisition of a small firm, and to encourage increasingly vig-
orous competition among existing firms in the market.
The first actual reference to the concept of potential compe-
tition appeared in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.83
A foreign pipeline company had secured a tentative purchase
commitment from a major local utility. After cutting its price
to a level low enough to secure the contract for itself, the only
local pipeline company successfully effected a merger with the
foreign company. The Supreme Court ruled that section 7 was
violated by the acquisition of a firm not actually present in the
local market but considered to be the only likely market entrant.
Specifically, the Court viewed the acquisition as foreclosing the
29. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526
(1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See also Robinson, Antitrust
Developments: 1973, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 163, 180 (1974); Note, United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.: Potential Competition Re-examined,
72 MicH. L. REV. 837 (1974).
30. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
31. P. SAumsoN, Ecoxomcs 496-97 (8th ed. 1970).
32. Id.
33. 376 U.S. 651 (1964). See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19
STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Sec-
tion 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 171.
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procompetitive effects which would -have resulted from the ac-
quiring local firm's having to gauge its market behavior with
an eye toward the foreign firm's status as a potential competitor.
While El Paso was arguably an actual competition case, 4
the Court later in the same term left no doubt as to its recogni-
tion of the doctrine of potential competition. In United States
v. Continental Can Co.,35 the Court held that section 7 was vio-
lated by the acquisition of a major manufacturer of glass contain-
ers by a major manufacturer of metal containers because of the
potentially adverse effects on the large area of competitive over-
lap. Of particular concern to the Court was the possibility that
the acquiring firm was seeking to insulate itself from the poten-
tial competition of the acquired firm in the production of contain-
ers for the same "end uses." Similarly, in United States v. Penn-
Olin Chemical Co.,36 it was held that a joint venture by two com-
panies, each of which had the capability to act individually,
would have violated section 7. The decision turned on what the
Court regarded as the unacceptable elimination of the potential
competition of the company that might have remained at the
edge of the market continually threatening to enter. In FTC
v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,37 the Court took the next logical step
in the development of the doctrine, ruling that the acquisition
of an existing firm by a firm that undeniably would have been
the most probable de novo entrant were it not for the merger
was a violation of section 7.88
Finally, in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,39 after
an extended discussion of the potential competition doctrine, the
Court held that a proper -assessment of Falstaff as a potential
competitor required separate consideration of "whether Falstaff
was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned
on the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence
on competitive conditions in the market."40 Because this issue
34. Before it would allow the construction of new pipelines, the
state required that the pipeline company secure contracts for the pur-
chase of transported natural gas. 376 U.S. at 659-60. Thus, by attempt-
ing to secure such a contract from the local utility, the foreign pipeline
company was arguably in actual competition with the local company
even though it was not "present" in the sense of transporting natural gas
in the local market.
35. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
36. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
37. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
38. Accord, Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
39. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
40. Id. at 532-33.
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was remanded to the district court, the Court did not address
the Government's argument that entry by merger when de novo
or "toehold" entry are arguably viable alternatives encourages
continued concentration of the market, with diminished potential
for vigorous competition in the future. Thus, the Court ex-
pressly left open the question whether section 7 would be vio-
lated by a merger which, under the circumstances, would have
no effect on the current level of competition in the relevant mar-
ket.41
Analysis of these cases reveals the development of at least
two parallel but separate theories of potential competition. The
first of these is the "probable actual entrant" theory,42 which
is applied to bar a merger when a preponderance of objective
evidence indicates that the acquiring firm would enter the mar-
ket de novo or by "toehold" acquisition were it not permitted
to merge with an established firm. The underlying assumption
of the theory is that if the merger does not take place, an addi-
tional significant competitor in the marketplace would discourage
oligopolistic behavior.
The second theory focuses on the "perceived potential en-
trant" and is based on the economic 'theory of limit pricing.43
While the "probable actual entrant" theory requires proof that
a firm has the economic incentive and financial capability to ac-
tually enter a given market without merger, the "perceived po-
tential entrant" theory broadens the ambit of the potential com-
petition doctrine by requiring proof only that the firms already
in the relevant market perceive the noncompetitor as a signifi-
cant enough threat to their oligopoly to compel maintenance of
prices at a sufficiently low level to discourage actual entry by
the noncompetitor.
The Falstaff argument that the merger should be prohibited
so that the would-be acquiring firm would remain a "possible
future entrant" into the relevant geographic market might be
characterized as an attempt by the Government to secure recog-
41. Id. at 537.
42. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 586 (1967)
(Harlan J., concurring); Haywood, Potential Competition and Bank
Mergers, 42 ANTITUST L.J. 725, 725-26 (1973); Robinson, supra note 29,
at 183-84; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1384 (1965).
43. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973);
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Haywood, supra note 42; Note,
supra note 29, at 841-53.
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nition of yet a third potential competition theory.44 If not an
entirely distinct theory, it is at least an attempt to moderate the
standard of proof required under the "probable actual entrant"
theory. Prior to Falstaff, the only judicial discussion of the "pos-
sible future entrant" theory had been in a series of unsuccessful
district court bank merger cases.45 While affording a new,
broader base for attacking allegedly anticompetitive mergers, the
theory is, in effect, the logical extension of the two established
theories. It simply reflects the argument that, because of the
trend toward increasing concentration in a given market, if ob-
jectively measurable market data indicate that an acquiring
firm has both the financial capability and the economic incentive
to enter that market other than by merger with an established
firm, it should be compelled to remain a possible future de novo
or "toehold" entrant despite its claims that a merger would be
the only method by which it would in fact enter.46
In Marine Bancorporation, the legality of the proposed
merger was evaluated solely in traditional terms of its effect on
the narrowly drawn local banking market. The Court reached
the undeniably logical conclusion that because of the strict statu-
tory restraints on de novo or "toehold" entry into the particular
local banking market, a challenge to the merger based on the
potential competition doctrine could not- be sustained.47 With
this decision, the Government again failed to obtain a definitive
ruling on the open question of whether section 7 embraces the
"possible future entrant" theory of potential competition. Nev-
ertheless, the Court did discuss "two preconditions" that must
be satisfied before it would rule whether this theory does in fact
evince a section 7 violation.48 Specifically, the Court stated that
it must be determined whether alternative means -of entering a
given geographic market are available and whether those means
would offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing de-
concentration or other procompetitive effects in that market.49
44. Brief for Appellant at 27-36, United States v. Marine Bancorpo-
ration, 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974). See United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 538 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 545
(Marshall, J., concurring); Robinson, supra note 29, at 185-90; Note, su-
pra note 29, at 854-61.
45. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
46. See generally Turner, supra note 42, at 1379-86.
47. 94 S. Ct. at 2879.
48. Id. at 2875-78. In his dissent to the Connecticut National Bank
decision, Justice White maintained that the "deconcentration" theory was
in fact recognized by the Court in Marine Bancorporation. United States
v. Connecticut Nat'1 Bank, 94 S. Ct. 2788, 2799 (1974).
49. 94 S. Ct. at 2875.
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The Government's failure to satisfy these preconditions in Marine
Bancorporation was attributable in large measure to the Court's
rejection of the "linked oligopoly" theory. By limiting analysis
of the anticompetitive effects of the merger to the Spokane met-
ropolitan area, the restrictive Washington banking laws"0 became
determinative. Within this limited purview, the Court was justi-
fied in concluding that even if it were assumed that NBC could
conceivably have entered Spokane de novo or by "toehold" acqui-
sition, the Government had failed to establish that the ultimate
result would be significantly improved competition in the Spo-
kane-area market.51
Unquestionably, the antitrust attitude of the Court has
changed.62 The Government's chances for successful application
of the potential competition doctrine in its effort to check the
trend toward increasing concentration in the commercial banking
industry have been diminished.53 However, notwithstanding this
immediate rebuff, it is noteworthy that the Court expressly rec-
ognized that by "introducing evidence of concentration ratios of
the magnitude [found in the Spokane-area market] the Govern-
ment established a prima facie case that [that] market was a
candidate for the potential competition doctrine."54 The broad
sweep of this significant observation was limited only by the
Court's statement that the "same factor that usually renders
[banking] markets concentrated and theoretical prospects for po-
tential competition § 7 cases-regulatory barriers to new entry-
will also make it difficult to establish that the doctrine invali-
dates a particular geographic extension merger."5 5 Thus it
would be erroneous to conclude that the potential competition
doctrine has been generally rejected;5 it would be more appro-
50. See note 2 supra.
51. 94 S. Ct. at 2878.
52. In one of the other major section 7 cases of the 1973 term, Jus-
tice Douglas suggested, in dissent, that by affirming the legality of a deep
mining coal producer's acquisition of a strip mining producer the Court
was reflecting a "deep-seated judicial bias against § 7 of the Clayton
Act." United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 527 (1974).
See Supreme Court: Emergence of a New Antitrust Majority Highlights
Business Regulation Decisions in 1973-74 Term, BNA DAiY REPORT FOR
ExEcumivEs, Aug. 20, 1974, at C-i; New Direction for Mergers (pt. 1), 676
BNA ANITRUSTTRADE REG. REP. B-i (1974); id. (pt. 2), 677 BNA ANTi-
TRUST TRADE REG. REP. B-1 (1974).
53. To some commentators, this development is hardly regrettable
See, e.g., Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia; An Economic View of Supreme
Court Decisions on Bank Mergers, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 860 (1973).
54. 94 S. Ct. at 2874.
55. Id. at 2875.
56. The Court, in fact, recently summarily affirmed a potential com-
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priate to expect that Marine Bancorporation will be limited to
its facts. Since an underlying principle of the potential compe-
tition doctrine is relative ease of entry into a given market, the
Court, confronted with a situation wherein this flexibility was
significantly limited by statute, made a most logical decision.
Within the context of a narrowly drawn local banking market,
statutory restrictions on geographic expansion rebut, for all prac-
tical purposes, conjectural market analyses of the "possible fu-
ture entrant" theory.57
Coupled with the Court's suggestions in earlier cases that
section 7 may, in fact, require the preservation of possible future
entrants into a given market as a means of insuring effective
long-run competition, 8 the extensive discussion in Marine
Bancorporation of the "two preconditions" should provide sub-
stantial encouragement to the Antitrust Division as it charts its
future section 7 strategy. The starting point for its efforts might
be to satisfy the "preconditions" by concentrating on objection-
able mergers in industries not characterized by heavy govern-
petition case in the nonbank area. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United
States, 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974).
57. The three dissenting Justices maintained that the majority had
afforded determinative weight to what, in effect, were erroneous conclu-
sions as to the impact of the Washington banking laws. This division
of opinion is largely attributable to disagreement over the facts and is
best reflected by the dissent's claim that "there were no impenetrable
legal or economic barriers to [NBC's entering the Spokane market other
than by merger with the Spokane bank]; and it is sufficiently plain from
the record that absent merger with [the Spokane bank], NBC could and
would either have made a toehold entry or been instrumental in estab-
lishing a sponsored bank in Spokane." 94 S. Ct. at 2881. This analysis
is clearly based on a repudiation of the higher standard of proof required
of the Government, undeniably a key factor in the Court's decision, and
on an underlying belief that such a rigorous standard unacceptably frus-
trates the purpose of section 7 to "bar mergers which may contribute
to further concentration in the structure of American business." Id. at
2885.
While the dissent vigorously disagreed with the higher standard of
proof applied by the majority in its analysis of the facts (a standard
which the dissent believed altered the basic elements of the potential
competition doctrine by requiring proof not only of likelihood of entry,
but of long-run success after entry), it, too, focused only on the Spokane-
area market. A more comprehensive dissent-entirely consistent with
the belief of the actual dissenters that a lower standard of proof should
be accepted in order to effect the underlying purposes of section 7-would
have urged acceptance of the economically sound, albeit empirically de-
ficient, "linked oligopoly" theory.
58. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537
(1973), citing Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 587 (1972),
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967), and United States
v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964).
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mental regulation. Equally important to its litigation strategy
is the careful attention that it must give to the Court's firm com-
mitment to "economic realities"-the common ground of the
three major section 7 decisions of the 1973 term.59 It is quite
apparent from these decisions that if the Court is to be satisfied
that the Government is adhering to the Brown Shoe standard
of "probabilities, not . . . ephemeral possibilities,"60 it will re-
quire substantial evidentiary support for the microeconomic
theories and the competitive realities upon which section 7 ac-
tions have been based.61 By prosecuting those cases that would
clearly satisfy the Marine Bancorporation preconditions, the
Government would be virtually assured that the Court would
render a definitive ruling on the "possible future entrant" theory.
An affirmative decision could reasonably be expected in light of
the Court's encouraging suggestions 2 and its oft-repeated dedica-
tion to the proposition that section 7 is designed to arrest mergers
"at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a
line of commerce [is] still in its incipiency."63
As to the applicability of the potential competition doctrine
to the particular problem of bank mergers, the Government is
left with three alternatives. The first is to continue to argue
that de novo and "toehold" entry are viable alternatives to entry
59. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974);
United States v. Connecticut Nat'1 Bank, 94 S. Ct. 2788 (1974); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
60. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
61. The Court's position on this matter was made very clear in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974), when
it rejected the Government's assertion that coal production statistics
alone were indicative of an impermissibly concentrated market. While
such statistics would presumably have been sufficient to make out a
prima facie section 7 case under United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court focused instead on the availability of coal
reserves as the key factor in determining whether the acquired company
could be considered a potential competitor. For support, it cited Brown
Shoe:
Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the
industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course,
the primary index of market power; but only a further exami-
nation of the particular market-its structure, history and prob-
able future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.
415 U.S. at 498, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
322 n.38 (1962) (emphasis added).
62. See cases cited in note 58 supra.
63. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2870
(1974), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317
(1962). See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277
(1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362
(1963).
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by merger in a traditional local banking market. This alternative
might offer some possibility for success if applied to challenged
bank mergers in states with less stringent statutory regulation
of the banking industry. The second alternative is to continue
to urge acceptance of the "linked oligopoly" theory through a
broadened reading of "section of the country." Although that
theory is based on sound economic analysis, 4 it is clear from
Marine Bancorporation that analysis unsupported by empirical
data will stand little chance of acceptance by the Court. The
Government's remaining alternative is to seek specific legislation
to curtail the "expansion by acquisition" activity of major state-
wide and nationwide banks and bank holding companies. This
third alternative would seem to afford the most comprehensive
and consistently successful long-run solution to the problem. 5
64. See note 20 supra.
65. Speaking at a seminar on merger law at the annual convention
of the Federal Bar Association, Peter Ward, Assistant Director of the
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, argued that since the
Supreme Court will likely continue to decide cases brought against con-
glomerates strictly on economic grounds as provided by section 7, Con-
gress should amend the Clayton Act to require consideration of social
and political consequences when determining the propriety of conglomer-
ate mergers. BNA DAmy REPORT FOR ExEcuTmvs, Sept. 5, 1974, at A-15.
On the other hand, Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Antitrust Division, maintained that incorporating social philosophy
into the Clayton Act would be a useless exercise because such abstract
matters cannot be measured quantitatively. While agreeing that the Jus-
tice Department and the FTC will have to prepare more detailed and
elaborate economic proof of injury if anticompetitive conglomerate merg-.
ers are to be blocked successfully, Wilson argued that vigorous enforce-
ment of merger law, based upon sound determinations of the economic
consequences of an extension acquisition, would solve any attendant so-
cial and political problems. Id. The most effective solution in the bank
merger area would seem to lie somewhere between these two viewpoints
-most likely in narrowly drawn legislation designed specifically to cur-
tail the anticompetitive activities of banks and bank holding companies.
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